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THE RESTRUCTURING OF
CORPORATE AMERICA
BY DANIEL R. FISCHEL*
On December 1, 1988, the Wall Street Journal
announced that the bidding for RJR Nabisco was
over. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company, better
known as KKR, had won by offering $25 billion, or
$107 per share. The leveraged buyout transaction,
financed almost exclusively by debt, including bil-
lions of dollars in junk bonds, was the largest and
most controversial in American history.
The size of the fees alone boggled the imagina-
tion. Lawyers, bankers, and other "advisors"
received $1.2 billion in fees from this single transac-
tion. Even the deposed Ross Johnson, RJR Nabisco's
former chairman, one of the losers in the bidding
contest, walked away with $53 million in severance
pay and other compensation.
What was accomplished by the transaction, other
than making everyone involved in it rich? RJR
Nabisco in 1988 was the nineteenth-ranking com-
pany on the Fortune 500 list with sales approaching
$20 billion. Its food and cigarette products, includ-
ing Oreo cookies, Barnum's Animals crackers, and
Winston cigarettes, were among the best known and
heavily advertised in the nation. But few believed
that the company could be run better now with
management having as its highest priority the
repayment of debt. At a time of widespread concern
that America was ceding world economic domi-
nance to the Japanese with their greater focus on
long-term planning and investment, the transaction
seemed to symbolize everything wrong with the
deal-driven decade of the 19 8 0s.
Robert Reich, then teaching at Harvard before
later becoming secretary of labor under President
Clinton, captured the negative public reaction to
the transaction perfectly in an article published in
the New York Times in early 1989. Titled
* Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law and Business, The
University of Chicago.
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"Leveraged Buyouts: America Pays the Price," the
article criticizes the deals of the 1980s and particu-
larly the buyout of RJR Nabisco. These deals created
paper profits, Reich argued, but hurt American
workers and competitiveness in the world.
"America," Reich concluded, "has had enough. Even
by the cynical standards of the 19 80's, Wall Street is
giving greed a bad name."
Time magazine made an even harsher assessment.
In its December 5, 1988, cover story on the RJR
Nabisco transaction, titled "The Game of Greed,"
Time, like Reich, claimed that the deals of the 1980s
raised serious questions about "greed, debt and the
well-being of American industry." The RJR Nabisco
transaction was simply the largest of the many "fruit-
less paper-shuffling deals" of the 1980s. The reporter
went so far as to see the buyout as a threat to
American survival:
The sums are so vast, and so apparently out of
line with any foreseeable benefits that the deal
might bring to American industry, that they
raise deep and disturbing doubts about the
direction of U.S. business at a time when
many firms lag badly in foreign competition.
Seldom since the age of the 19th century rob-
ber barons has corporate behavior been so
open to question. The battle for RJR Nabisco
seems to have crossed an invisible line that
separates reasonable conduct from anarchy.
Time's historical reference to the age of the rob-
ber barons struck a nerve. The bitter sallies against
greed and the excesses of capitalism in the 1980s
closely mirrored comparable attacks on J. P. Morgan,
Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Jay Gould,
and other prominent industrialists and financiers in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In
fact, the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco itself had
a close historical parallel-J. P. Morgan's 1901 debt-
financed acquisition of eight steel companies to form
U.S. Steel. That transaction, the largest acquisition
in American history until the RJR Nabisco buyout,
was also widely condemned at the time. Critics
attacked the size of the deal and the role of the
financiers on Wall Street who made it possible.
Some even predicted that the transaction would
lead to "socialism" and "rioting in the streets," just as
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Time predicted the RJR Nabisco buyout would lead
to "anarchy."
The only problem with the historical parallel was
that Time did not take it far enough. The age of the
robber barons was also the time of the second indus-
trial revolution, one of the great periods of economic
growth in modem history. The critics of the robber
barons focused superficially on the perceived excess-
es of the time but ignored their much more impor-
tant legacy of building a nationwide system of rail-
roads, power generation, and modernizing produc-
tion, both industrial and agricultural. And the cre-
ation of U.S. Steel, far from leading to rioting in the
streets, was ultimately viewed as one of J. P.
Morgan's greatest accomplishments. U.S. Steel went
on to become one of the most important and suc-
cessful corporations in America for much of the
twentieth century.
Time's criticism of the RJR Nabisco buyout and
the other deals of the 1980s, like the outcry over the
robber barons a century earlier, thus missed the sig-
nificance of what was occurring. A deeper grasp of
history might have suggested a different story,
emphasizing how the 1980s, like the age of the rob-
ber barons, were completely misunderstood by con-
temporary observers. In fact, the decade's wave of
restructuring transactions, including the RJR
Nabisco buyout, created tremendous wealth for
investors and society as a whole. During the 1980s,
the Dow Jones Industrial Average tripled from 1,000
to 3,000 and the real value of public firms' equity
more than doubled from $1.4 to $3 trillion. Selling
shareholders alone received $750 billion in gains
(measured in 1992 dollars) from restructuring trans-
actions between 1976 and 1990. Millions of new
jobs were created in the process.
Radical change always produces major disloca-
tions with winners and losers, and the 1980s were no
exception. The restructuring revolution's biggest
winner was the innovative and entrepreneurial
investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham
Lambert, particularly its high-yield or, as it was more
popularly known, junk-bond department headed by
Michael Milken. Drexel, which through its
high-yield bond department became the financier of
many of the big restructuring transactions of the
1980s, including the RJR Nabisco buyout, went from
nowhere to being the most successful investment
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banking firm on Wall Street. Michael Milken in
turn went from obscurity to become one of the rich-
est men in America. Drexel's and Milken's success,
however, created bitter enemies. First there were the
displaced investment bankers who found themselves
increasingly irrelevant as Drexel and Milken became
more and more dominant. Then there were senior
management of corporate America who now were
faced with the choice of doing a better job or being
unceremoniously dumped from office following a
Drexel-financed takeover. Approximately 10 per-
cent of the Fortune 500 in existence in 1980 disap-
peared entirely as a result of restructuring transac-
tions. Through their lobbying arm, the Business
Roundtable, the management establishment, togeth-
er with the displaced investment banks and other
opponents of change such as labor unions, formed a
powerful interest group dedicated to waging holy
war against Drexel, Milken, and the other players in
the restructuring revolution that was threatening
their very existence.
THE NEED FOR RESTRUCTURING AND THE
MODERN CORPORATION
In 1932, Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means
published their classic work, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, without question the most
influential book on corporate America ever written.
Berle and Means's central thesis was that the large
corporation of the twentieth century differed
markedly from its nineteenth-century predecessors.
Historically, corporations were small-scale ventures
in which the shareholders, whom Berle and Means
referred to as the "owners," were the decision mak-
ers. Because they bore the consequences of their
decisions, they had every incentive to work hard and
try their best. If they didn't, the only people hurt
would be themselves.
But this all changed when corporations grew
increasingly large by raising money from thousands
of outside investors who had no involvement in run-
ning the business. Control now rested with profes-
sional managers, not with the true "owners" of the
corporation. Worse still, the real owners no longer
even had the ability to hire or select who would be
in control. Rather, the managers themselves, not the
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shareholders, nominated the candidates to serve as
directors. The owners' role is limited to
rubber-stamping this self-perpetuating scheme by
casting a vote, typically by proxy, in favor of
whomever is nominated by those in control.
Managers in the modem corporation, in Berle and
Means's view, no longer have a reason to perform
well. The firm's owners benefit if the corporation is
profitable, but those in control care much less about
performance precisely because they are not owners.
And, since their domination of the voting machinery
makes it next to impossible for them to be replaced,
they have no reason to exert themselves to maximize
profitability. Better to be lazy and enjoy the perks of
office. Formulated during the Great Depression, Berle
and Means's pessimistic assessment of the modern
corporation seemed right on target.
The small-scale firms idealized by Berle and Means
worked fine so long as the wealth of the owners was
sufficient to conduct business. For business ventures
where more capital was required, money could be
borrowed from a bank. But for some large business
ventures such as, for example, building a nationwide
system of railroads, more capital is required than can
realistically be borrowed from a bank. In these situa-
tions, entrepreneurs can raise funds from investors
worldwide in exchange for a share of the profits. This
is in essence a description of the modern publicly
held corporation, in which investors provide firms
with needed funds to pursue investment projects for
which large amounts of capital are required. What-
ever their flaws, large corporations are necessary for
economic growth in a modern society.
Still, Berle and Means were on to something.
Because in large corporations investors and decision
makers are not the same people, conflicts of interest
are inevitable. Managers who are performing poorly,
or whose skills have become obsolete, have no incen-
tive to fire themselves. While investors have the the-
oretical ability to nominate their own slate of direc-
tors and wage a proxy fight to oust the incumbents,
this rarely occurs. In most cases shareholders, just as
Berle and Means said, are too dispersed and unin-
formed to coordinate effectively for a proxy fight.
The difficulty of implementing radical corporate
change became, if anything, greater in the.decades
after The Modern Corporation and Private Property
was published. Stock ownership of officers and direc-
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tors in the corporations they managed, never high to
begin with, declined steadily after the 1930s. This
made it even less likely that senior management
would favor investors' interests over their own when
there was a conflict between the two. At the same
time, laws such as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933,
which prohibited banks from owning stocks, and
similar laws, which restricted stock ownership by
insurance companies and mutual funds, reduced the
influence of large, sophisticated institutional
investors. These laws also gave corporate managers
greater discretion to pursue their own objectives at
investors' expense. Finally, corporations simply
became larger, again making it harder for atomistic
and dispersed investors to monitor performance in
any meaningful way.
One strategy widely used by corporate managers
to increase size was to enter new and unrelated lines
of business. This process of conglomeration, fre-
quently accomplished by acquisition, became
increasingly common after World War II. With the
conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s, growth
through diversification became the dominant strate-
gy of American business. Giant firms, such as ITT,
Esmark, and Northwest Industries, engaged in multi-
ple and unrelated lines of business, seeming to repre-
sent the way of the future. Acquisitions in the 19 70s
and early 19 80s such as Marathon Oil by U.S. Steel,
Montgomery Ward by Mobil, and Hughes Aircraft
by General Motors, demonstrated that few firms
could resist the conglomeration temptation.
If Berle and Means were writing a sequel in 1980,
these developments would have provided powerful
additional ammunition for their original thesis.
Growth through diversification created obvious ben-
efits for corporate managers. Bigger firms meant
more resources and staff under their control, which
in turn usually meant greater security and prestige,
as well as increased compensation. But how did
shareholders benefit from conglomeration? They
received none of the increased power and prestige
associated with increased size. Nor did shareholders
need their corporations to diversify because they
could accomplish the same objective themselves at
far lower cost. From shareholders' perspective, there
was no reason for corporation A in the steel business
to pay a lot of money to acquire corporation B in the
clothing business. A shareholder who wanted to
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diversify and invest in the two businesses could sim-
ply buy shares in both. With the development of
diversified mutual funds in the 1970s, shareholders
could invest in the entire market at trivial cost.
The. diversification explanation for conglomera-
tion now seemed little more than a rationalization
for managers increasing their salary and perquisites
at investors' expense. But what could shareholders,
the same powerless investors identified by Berle and
Means, do to reverse the trend of continuing corpo-
rate expansion, frequently into unrelated lines of
business? Investors, of course, could refuse to buy on
those extremely rare occasions when established cor-
porations attempted to raise additional funds by sell-
ing new equity. Alternatively, they could sell their
existing shares, but this accomplished little to send
management a message. The price someone else was
willing to pay reflected the firm's business prospects.
At most, one powerless shareholder was substituted
for another.
THE RESTRUCTURING REVOLUTION
Approaching the 1980s, corporate America was
badly in need of a change. American firms had
become larger and more diffuse in their operations.
Corporate accountability to shareholders was weak,
and shareholders had little or no ability to force
those in control to maximize profitability. The Dow
Jones Industrial Average, reflecting these unfortu-
nate realities, was mired in a long-term slump.
The restructuring boom of the 1980s-the wave
of hostile acquisitions, tender offers, leveraged buy-
outs and recapitalizaions, divestitures, spin-offs and
the like-dramatically altered the economic land-
scape. What occurred was nothing less than a revolu-
tionary change in corporate structure, a radical shift
in power from managers to shareholders. Berle and
Means never even imagined that such a fundamental
shift could occur without regulatory intervention.
The boom occurred when it did because of six
overlapping and interrelated major developments.
First, the energy crisis of the 1 970s caused a tenfold
increase in the price of crude oil from 1973 to 1979,
with expected continued large increases in the
1980s. The profitability of energy firms exploded,
triggering a race to increase drilling and develop-
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ment efforts and find substitute energy sources. The
energy crisis also had big spillover effects as firms
and households changed their behavior to econo-
mize on energy costs by, for example, migrating to
the Sunbelt states, insulating their houses, or buying
small, fuel-efficient cars. When the expected
increases in energy prices in the 1980s did not occur,
and oil prices fell instead, the industry crashed, forc-
ing a major contraction.
Second, unprecedented improvements in informa-
tion processing and telecommunications technology
in the 1970s and 1980s produced innovations such as
the development of personal computers and the wire-
less telephone. These innovations created industries of
their own, but their impact was much broader. Tasks
previously performed by large numbers of individuals
at corporate headquarters could now be handled by
many fewer employees who could work at decentral-
ized locations. As the technology improved and the
costs of computing capacity fell during the 1980s, the
work patterns of every industry had to adjust.
Third, competition intensified dramatically in
many sectors as markets became increasingly global-
ized. Japan and Germany, whose economies recov-
ered rapidly after World War II, became major inter-
national economic powerhouses. American firms
now had to compete in a way they never had to
before in such basic industries as automobiles, steel,
tires, and electronics. Financial markets also became
increasingly international. The high nominal infla-
tion of the late 1970s, itself related to the energy cri-
sis, caused investors to search the world for attrac-
tive investment alternatives.
Fourth, major regulatory developments in the late
1970s and early 1980s created new entrepreneurial
opportunities. Deregulation of the oil and gas, air-
line and transportation, financial services, and
broadcasting industries occurred during this time.
These developments were in turn related to external
events that made existing regulatory schemes obso-
lete. The energy crisis of the 1970s and the resulting
high nominal inflation, for example, ended the via-
bility of price controls on oil and gas and
interest-rate ceilings that could be paid to depositors
by financial institutions. Similarly, the advent of
cable television immediately rendered the regulation
of the broadcasting industry obsolete. Regulation,
like industry, had to be modernized.
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Fifth, the election of President Ronald Reagan in
1980 resulted in a major relaxation of U.S. antitrust
policy. Transactions could now go forward without
government intervention on antitrust grounds unless
clearly anticompetitive. This in turn facilitated
restructuring because it enabled assets and businesses
to be readily combined and transferred among firms
without regulatory interference.
Sixth, the dramatic growth of the high-yield bond
market made it possible for takeover entrepreneurs
who themselves otherwise lacked sufficient funds to
make credible threats to acquire firms of virtually
any size. The investment banking firm of Drexel
Burnham, and particularly Michael Milken, the head
of its high-yield bond division, was primarily respon-
sible for this development. Drexel and Milken estab-
lished contacts with the emerging class of takeover
entrepreneurs-T. Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn, James
Farley, Sir James Goldsmith, Ronald Perelman, Saul
Steinberg, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company,
among others-who routinely came to Drexel to
finance takeover attempts knowing that Drexel had
a stable of institutional clients interested in investing
in Drexel deals. Drexel became known as a firm that
could, if necessary, finance a takeover bid by raising
billions of dollars within a matter of hours. Its repu-
tation was so formidable that a Drexel-backed deal
for billions of dollars could go forward even if no
money had been raised. All that was necessary was a
letter from Drexel announcing that it was "highly
confident" the funds would be available when need-
ed. These Drexel "highly confident" letters became
the scourge of corporate America.
The coalescence of these six developments creat-
ed a window of opportunity to restructure American
business. Restructurings tended to be concentrated in
industries such as oil and gas, financial services, and
insurance, where firms had failed to adapt to chang-
ing economic and regulatory conditions.
Restructurings also occurred in industries where there
had been rapid technological change, such as tires
and broadcasting. Finally, inefficiently run firms, par-
ticularly conglomerates that had grown too large by
acquiring other firms in unrelated lines of business,
were another prime source for restructurings. Firms in
each of these categories needed a major shake-up, a
fundamental change in business strategy.
Restructurings facilitated such fundamental
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change by altering target firms' organizational and
financial structure. Reorganized firms typically had
much more concentrated equity ownership and
higher leverage than before. More concentrated
equity ownership meant that senior management
and large shareholders had a greater incentive to
focus on profitability. The better job they did, the
more money they made. Streamlining and cutting
back on unprofitable business lines also became
more attractive as an option. The perquisites of
office were terrific so long as someone else was pay-
ing. Now that senior management had to pay more
of the tab themselves, perks became much less indis-
pensable. If downsizing and streamlining operations
meant a smaller office and staff, greater wealth from
increased stock values was a nice consolation.
Leverage also was an agent for change. When pur-
chases of outstanding equity were financed with
debt, shareholders immediately received a significant
return on their investment. And the obligation to
repay the debt forced firms to contract. Funds that
had previously been used to finance unprofitable
investment projects or acquisitions now had to be
paid out to lenders. To pay down debt faster, firms
frequently sold peripheral businesses to third-party
buyers who specialized in those areas. Throughout
corporate America there was a renewed emphasis on
focus, on developing core businesses and reversing
the post-World War II trend toward conglomeration.
Restructurings made it possible to do something
about mismanaged firms as never before. The much
maligned leveraged buyout transaction of RJR
Nabisco was a perfect example. RJR Nabisco was
formed in 1985 when R. J. Reynolds Industries, a
tobacco company founded in 1875, merged with
Nabisco Brands, a food company. In 1986, F. Ross
Johnson, formerly CEO of Nabisco, became CEO of
RJR Nabisco. Johnson's tenure was marked by disas-
trous business decisions coupled with personal
extravagance. He invested $400 million in the
development of a smokeless cigarette that consumers
hated. To gain market-share, he introduced and
heavily marketed discount cigarettes, which hurt
profitability by diverting customers from RJR's more
profitable lines, Winston, Camel, and Salem. At the
same time, Johnson tried to manipulate reported
earnings to convince investors that nothing was
amiss. Johnson, for example, adopted a practice of
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loading cigarettes on its already well-stocked distrib-
utors by selling to them at discounts just before
scheduled price increases went into effect. While
RJR was able to report higher sales and earnings, it
paid a big price. Management forfeited future sales at
higher prices, accelerated the payment of excise
taxes, and alienated smokers who wound up purchas-
ing stale cigarettes.
Johnson was also a man who enjoyed the perks of
office. He built ostentatious new corporate headquar-
ters filled with expensive art, acquired a fleet of cor-
porate jets for personal use, and purchased exclusive
residences for weekend retreats. Because of his fond-
ness of being seen with celebrities, particularly sports
stars, he spent millions to hire them as "consultants."
Not surprisingly, the market was less than thrilled
with RJR Nabisco under Johnson's tenure. In 1987,
the year before the buyout, RJR's stock price fell 8.6
percent while that of Philip Morris, its closest com-
petitor, increased 19 percent. RJR Nabisco, in short,
was ripe for a change of direction, a restructuring.
This is exactly what KKR's leveraged buyout of RJR
Nabisco accomplished. Equity ownership was con-
centrated, leverage increased, and Johnson was
thrown out as CEO.
These changes achieved their desired result. Under
new ownership and leadership, RJR Nabisco became
a far more profitable company. Costs were reduced
immediately by eliminating excesses such as thirty
luxury apartments, seven of eleven corporate jets,
thirty athletes on retainer, and thousands of unneed-
ed positions. Many low-profit product lines were sold,
while spending on research and development, and
marketing and sales for high-profit businesses was
increased. Loading, the smokeless cigarette, and the
discount-brand strategy were all eliminated. New
successful products, particularly Teddy Grahams
snack food, were introduced. Debt was quickly paid
down using proceeds from asset sales and the sale of
new equity. By the end of 1991, the RJR Nabisco
buyout created more than $10 billion of value for
investors. The critics, like Time, who predicted the
buyout would threaten American survival and lead
to anarchy could not have been more wrong.
Senior corporate management across America
were forced by the restructuring wave to be more
responsive to investors' desires for efficient perfor-
mance and high securities prices. Those who did not
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were only inviting a hostile tender offer or leveraged
buyout. Better to make necessary, even if painful,
changes than be out of a job. If a hostile bid was
made or anticipated, the best defense frequently was
to copy the prospective acquirer's strategy and hope
that was good enough.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company was a case in
point. Faced with declining prospects in the tire
industry, Goodyear decided to diversify by acquiring
the Celeron Oil company for $800 million in 1983.
Goodyear's equity value declined by almost $250
million as a result, because investors saw no benefit
in the combination of tires and oil. In 1986, Sir
James Goldsmith began purchasing Goodyear shares
aggressively with the announced intention of revers-
ing the company's diversification program. Alarmed
by the threat of a hostile takeover posed by
Goldsmith, Goodyear launched a debt-financed
share repurchase, paying $2.2 billion to acquire
Goldsmith's shares and an additional 36.5 percent of
the outstanding stock. Remaining shareholders,
including senior management, now owned a larger
share of a more leveraged company. The company's
disastrous diversification efforts were at an end. In-
vestors approved. Goodyear's equity value increased
by more than $750 million on a market-adjusted
basis during the time from Goldsmith's investment
to the leveraged recapitalization.
What Goldsmith did for Goodyear, Boone
Pickens did for much of the oil industry. During the
first half of the 1980s Pickens, through his company
Mesa Petroleum, launched takeover bids for Cities
Service Company, KN Energy Corporation, Gulf
Oil, Phillips Petroleum, and Unocal. Almost
single-handedly, Pickens forced a major and needed
contraction in the oil and gas industry. Cities
Service, for example, was trading at $35 when Mesa
began purchasing shares. When Cities Service was
bought shortly thereafter by Armand Hammer's
Occidental Petroleum for $53 a share, Mesa and
other Cities Services investors made a huge profit.
Pickens then turned his sights to Gulf. After Gulf
refused his demand that it spin off some of its oil
reserves into a trust for shareholders, Pickens decided
to wage a proxy fight to throw out Gulf's directors.
Pickens lost the proxy fight but won big in the
marketplace. Gulf stock had been trading at approxi-
mately $38 when Mesa began accumulating its
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shares. Pickens had put Gulf in play, and there was
no turning back. Chevron eventually acquired Gulf
in a $13.3 billion deal at $80 per share. For Mesa
and other Gulf shareholders, it was hard to imagine
a better outcome. The chain of events triggered by
Pickens's demand that Gulf return the value of some
of its oil reserves to its shareholders had caused
Gulfs stock to rise by more than forty points, dou-
bling its value. And the deal also accomplished
Pickens's objective of forcing the industry to con-
tract. When Chevron acquired Gulf, $13.3 billion
that could have been used for unproductive drilling
and expansion programs was returned to sharehold-
ers instead.
Within a few months, Mesa struck again, this time
launching a tender offer for Phillips, located in
Bartlesville, Oklahoma. Although Pickens was born in
Oklahoma, Bartlesville regarded him as anything but a
favorite son. Memories were still too fresh of what hap-
pened to Cities Service's Oklahoma operations after
Pickens forced the sale of Cities Service to Occidental
Petroleum. The company downsized and thousands of
workers lost their jobs. Bartlesville was determined to
fight Pickens to prevent the same thing from happen-
ing again. Special church services were organized for
the sole purpose of asking God to help Phillips and the
people of Bartlesville to defeat Pickens.
Phillips's management and their investment
bankers ultimately decided more than divine inter-
vention was needed. They decided to buy victory by
purchasing Mesa's shares for $53 per share and pay
Mesa an additional $25 million for "expenses." For
Mesa, which began purchasing Phillips shares in the
high 30s, this deal was too good to pass up. Phillips
was rid of Pickens, but its troubles were not over.
Carl Icahn immediately began threatening a
takeover attempt, publicly criticizing Phillips for hav-
ing bought out Mesa in what was commonly referred
to as a greenmail transaction. Eventually, Phillips
solved the problem by repurchasing almost half its
shares at $53, the same price paid to Mesa, financed
by $3 billion of new debt. The required retrenchment
followed inevitably, as Phillips now had to sell assets
and avoid unprofitable investments to pay down its
debt, just as Mesa or Icahn would have had to do if
either of them succeeded in their bids.
Mesa had taken on a series of bigger,
better-known oil companies and made money every
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single time, almost $500 million in total profits. In
each case, bellicose posturing by company execu-
tives about the need to continue with business as
usual had been followed by capitulation. Now the
industry was out to crush Pickens, but Pickens was
undeterred. He decided to make a bid for Unocal,
another large oil company.
After acquiring 14 percent of Unocal stock in the
open market, Pickens announced a two-step $8.1
billion offer to acquire the remaining shares. Mesa
said it would pay $54 in cash to acquire 37 percent
additional shares and then acquire the remaining
shares by paying $54 in high-yield debt securities
underwritten by Drexel. Unocal countered by offer-
ing to purchase 29 percent of its outstanding shares
by paying other high-yield debt securities valued at
$72. The catch was that Unocal's offer was struc-
tured so that Mesa, a 14 percent shareholder, was
ineligible to participate in the $72 exchange offer.
When the Delaware Supreme Court upheld
Unocal's exclusionary offer, Mesa was beaten.
Unocal stockholders had no reason to sell to Mesa
for $54 when they could exchange their stock for
$72 in debt securities.
The press viewed Mesa's defeat as a victory for
Unocal and its chairman, Fred Hartley, but with a
big price tag. Although Unocal and Hartley "won,"
the Wall Street Journal reported, "Unocal hardly came
out of the war unscathed." By having to "quadruple"
its long-term debt to $5.3 billion to finance its $72
exchange offer, Unocal would have to cut back on its
operations "for years." Hartley's gloomy assessment,
shared by the Journal, was that this retrenchment
certainly wasn't "anything to brag about."
Hartley and the Journal had it exactly backward.
Pickens's efforts made Unocal a vastly more prof-
itable company. Prior to Pickens's arrival on the
scene, Unocal was a company with little debt and
lots of cash, which it spent on major expansion and
exploration ventures. In the five years preceding its
leveraged recapitalization, Unocal announced five
such major investments in a declining industry,
which had the combined effect of reducing share-
holder value by $640 million. In the years following
the recap, the company, now disciplined by its
increased debt, announced no further new invest-
ments. Unocal's forced reversal of its expansion pro-
gram resulted in investors regaining much of the
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value previously lost by bad management decisions.
The 1980s had many similar success stories: the
restructurings of CBS and ABC in response to pres-
sure from Ted Turner; the end of conglomerates like
Beatrice and Northwest Industries, which were
acquired and restructured by KKR and Jim Farley
respectively; and the restructuring of Allegis
Corporation, parent of United Airlines, after a
takeover attempt by Coniston Partners. The restruc-
turing of Allegis alone, which involved a leveraged
stock buyback coupled with the resignation of the
chairman, who during his tenure had made a series
of value-destroying diversifying acquisitions, caused
Allegis's stock to rise in value by more than $1.5 bil-
lion on a market-adjusted basis.
Of course not every transaction during the 19 80 s
was a success story. Some restructurings failed; some
other firms that would have benefited from change
avoided restructuring altogether. Overall, however,
the successes vastly outnumbered the failures. Firms
involved in restructurings were typically leaner,
more profitable operations as a result, and corporate
managers now had to be sensitive to the bottom line
as they never had before. Corporate accountability
was restored. As in all periods of rapid change and
innovation, there were losers as well as winners.
Old-line Wall Street investment banking firms
watched on the sidelines while the upstart Drexel
went from near bankruptcy to become the most prof-
itable investment banking firm in the country.
Entrenched corporate management of the Fortune
500, who were forced to streamline their operations
and be more accountable or be replaced altogether,
were also opponents of change. The savings and
loan industry, a staple of government housing policy
since the 1930s, became insolvent and obsolete. As
traumatic as these dislocations may have been, we
should not forget that the 1980s were a period of
tremendous wealth creation and innovation in
financial markets. When we assess the way in which
our laws and those who administered them respond-
ed to the financial revolution of the 1980s, we must
take care to hold the entire picture before us.
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